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SIGNALLING AND CAUSATION IN
INSIDER TRADING
William J. Carney*
The multiple meanings of causation, the divergent views on the
required intensity of causation, the differing patterns of stock own-
ership and relief sought, all combine to make this the most confus-
ing of all confusing areas.**
Revelations of major insider trading cases during 1986 have led to charges
that major participants in the financial markets have failed to act respon-
sibly, and to pleas for further regulation, both of insider trading and of the
market for corporate control.1 This Article will examine the nature of the
harm alleged to occur in insider trading, and will conclude that little harm
can be demonstrated to particular investors, to markets generally, to issuers,
or to bidders. While insider trading has long been unlawful under the fed-
eral securities laws, there has been little examination of who is harmed by
insider trading.2 The purpose of this Article is to explore that issue. No
* Charles Howard Candler Professor, Emory University Law School. I wish to ac-
knowledge the assistance of John W. Spotts, Emory Law School, 1987. Thanks are also due to
Professors Fred S. McChesney of Emory, Jonathan R. Macey of Cornell, Dean Henry G.
Manne of George Mason and William K.S. Wang of Hastings for their helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this Article. I also acknowledge the helpful conversations that occurred at a
Liberty Fund Colloquium on Insider Trading, held under the auspices of the Emory Law &
Economics Center, in May 1985, which generated the ideas found in this Article. I am, of
course, solely responsible for the errors that may remain.
** 2 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD
§ 4.7(551), at 86 (1985).
1. Dennis Levine was accused and later pleaded guilty to trading on confidential infor-
mation about takeovers. Drexel OfficialAccused by SEC of Inside Trades, Wall St. J., May 13,
1986, at 3, col. 1; Fallen Star: How Inside Knowledge Made, Ruined Career of Dennis B.
Levine, Wall St. J., May 15, 1986, at 1, col. 5. Arbitrageur Ivan Boesky was later accused of
having dealt with Levine to secure the same information. Big Trader to Pay US. $100 Million
for Insider Abuses, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1986, at 1, col. 6; Legend Turned Inside Trader:
Boesky Touch Seemed Magic, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1986, at 37, col. 3; see also A Wall St.
Lawyer Admits Insider Guilt, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1986, at D4, col. 1 (describing a ring
including an associate in a Wall Street law firm who passed information on to four other
persons, including an arbitrage analyst at Marcus Schloss & Co., and analysts at Drexel Burn-
ham Lambert Inc. and Mosely, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden Inc. and a client of the latter
firm).
2. In his seminal work, H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET
(1966), Henry G. Manne argued that outside investors who buy and hold are less likely to be
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coherent theory of significant investor harm has been developed by either the
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) or the courts. The case law is con-
fused beyond coherent explanation, as the authors of one of the leading trea-
tises on securities regulation have noted.3
Causation in this Article is intended to mean that which is required for an
event to occur. Here the event in question is the purchase or sale of securi-
ties by a buyer or seller lacking the information possessed by the insider.
Too often the insider trading literature treats the magnitude of the loss as an
event "caused" by insider trading. That treatment confuses events and their
consequences. The loss of an investor is caused by revelation of truthful
information, which he or she lacked at the time of trading, and which causes
the market to revalue the particular issuer's shares. The purpose of this Ar-
ticle is to use modem financial theory to examine what triggers investor ac-
tions to buy or sell securities, and how insider trading can trigger such
actions. This Article concludes that most trading decisions are reached on
bases entirely separate from the presence or absence of insider trading, and
that only a relatively small set of transactions can be said to be "caused" by
insider trading.
Insider trading is defined here as trading on an informational advantage in
public markets where the advantage is derived from firm-specific informa-
tion about the issuer, rather than from information about general market
conditions. Such information may be obtained by virtue of a relationship to
the issuer, to a prospective bidder for the issuer's shares, or to agents of
either. Trading may either occur face-to-face or through an impersonal mar-
ket. Where investors are directly solicited, the insider has in fact induced
the other person to transact with him or her, and causation is relatively
clear.4 These cases are consistent with common law notions of causation
and with common experience, and cause little difficulty. They are not the
subject of this Article, which will focus on trading in impersonal markets.
Finance literature offers real hope for constructing a theory of causation
harmed by inside information because they trade on an infrequent basis. Id. at 109. Manne
further argued that since insider trading moves stock prices in the correct direction, it reduces
rather than increases random harm in transactions between uninformed investors. Id. at 107-
08. If anyone is harmed, Manne argued that it was only active traders. Id. This Article
builds, as do virtually all articles in the insider trading area, on Manne's important insights.
My principal area of disagreement with Manne's work is modest: that only some insider
trades move stock prices, and that following recent empirical studies, only specialists can gen-
erally be expected to trade in response to insider trading.
3. 2 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD
§ 4.7(551) (1985).
4. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
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in insider trading cases in impersonal securities markets.' One conclusion of
this Article is that demonstration of uncompensated harm in insider trading
cases is extremely rare, and is dependent upon proof of particular circum-
stances not previously addressed by the courts. The remoteness of these cir-
cumstances casts considerable doubt upon the wisdom of devoting large
portions of scarce enforcement resources to policing insider trading.6
In part I, this Article will review the legal concept of transaction causa-
tion in insider trading.7 Courts have long recognized the difficulties with
finding causation in transactions in impersonal securities markets' and have
divided over who has in fact been caused to trade. Some courts have held
that all traders on the other side from the insider's position have been in-
duced to trade. Others maintain that no one who trades in impersonal mar-
kets is caused to trade. Neither position is entirely correct.
This Article will then examine various legal arguments that insider trad-
ing harms others beyond those trading in markets when insiders trade. The
well known arguments about harm to issuers from trading by insiders will be
reviewed only briefly. Instead, this Article will focus on the harm to bidders
5. A word of caution is necessary. Modem financial economics is still in its infancy, and
even the most widely accepted hypotheses are subject to criticism on the basis that some evi-
dence exists to contradict them. But that fact does not mean that we should reject these hy-
potheses out of hand; rather, it means that our best understanding of how financial markets
operate may be subject to future revision when further evidence requires it.
6. For an earlier criticism of emphasis on insider trading enforcement, see Dooley, En-
forcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1 (1980). In fiscal year 1984, insider
trading cases represented only 13 of 299 enforcement actions initiated by the SEC. SEC Over-
sight: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Fi-
nance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1985)
(statement of John S.R. Shad, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission). In
1985 insider trading cases represented either 4% or 7% of the enforcement case load. Id. at
55, 224 (statement of John S.R. Shad, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission).
7. Transaction causation involves the notion that the wrongdoer caused a plaintiff to act
in a securities transaction. This is to be distinguished from loss causation, which involves a
determination of whether the wrongful act caused harm, even though it did not cause trading
by a particular plaintiff, because the plaintiff was relying on the integrity of market processes
that were allegedly distorted by the wrongful act. See generally A. BROMBERG & L. LOWEN-
FELS, supra note 3, § 4.7(551), at 85; Note, Causation and Liability in Private Actions for Proxy
Violations, 80 YALE LJ. 107, 123-24 (1970).
8. This Article will not discuss such threshold questions as what information is worth
taking seriously, which involves questions of materiality, or whether a particular investor in
fact took it seriously, which involves questions of reliance. It is worth noting that the courts
generally have rejected reliance as an element of a plaintiff's case since Affiliated Ute Citizens,
especially in class actions involving impersonal securities markets. While the courts have
granted plaintiffs a presumption in favor of reliance in omissions cases, defendants are permit-
ted to rebut the presumption. Rifkin v. Crow, 574 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1978); Rochez Bros. v.
Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976). See generally T.
HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION, § 13.5, at 463-64 (1985).
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caused by trading on advance news of takeovers, and on the harm to finan-
cial markets generally that results from investor demoralization due to in-
sider trading. This Article will conclude that all pretense of protecting
investors from trading errors, or of protecting issuers or bidders from harm
caused by theft of information, has been abandoned by the SEC, which has
relied on previously discredited "unfair profits" arguments to justify banning
such trading.9
In part II, this Article will examine theories and evidence concerning the
nature of investors' decisions to buy or sell particular securities. It will begin
with a general review of the current understanding of stock market effi-
ciency, and then proceed to describe the mechanisms of market efficiency
that inform traders of valuable information about stocks. Finally, a brief
description of the Capital Assets Pricing Model will be presented. The most
important observation is that all stocks with the same degree of market risk
will carry identical expected returns so that traders will not be moved by a
"shortage" or "surplus" of supply or demand to buy or sell particular securi-
ties. The financial literature will then be used to develop a description of
causation.
In part II, this Article will also examine the implications of this theory for
insider trading. Absent some signal to the market by the insider, insider
trading induces no traders to enter the market, or to make a decision to buy
or sell. Traders on opposite sides of these transactions have reacted to other
stimuli in reaching their decisions. To the extent that the market is sig-
nalled, and traders decide that some information has not yet been revealed,
they generally enter on the same side of the market as the insider, and are
thus on notice that some unrevealed information exists.
Generally, only market-makers or specialists may be caused to trade on
the opposite side of the market by such insider trading if no one else is avail-
able to match an offer. Because of their intimate knowledge of trading pat-
terns in such stocks, these professionals are in the best position to adjust
their bid and asked prices to reflect increased buying or selling pressure asso-
ciated with insider trading. These costs become a general cost of trading for
all who trade in such securities and, thus, part of the transaction costs of
informing the market about the current value of securities.
Finally, in part III, this Article will make some general observations about
9. Unfairness was rejected in fiduciary settings in Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462
(1977) and in insider trading cases generally in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232




the demand for insider trading rules in view of the fact that little uncompen-
sated harm can be found.
I. INSIDER TRADING IN EFFICIENT MARKETS
This section examines notions of causation in insider trading found in
three sources: common law, case law under federal insider trading rules,
and recently articulated regulatory justifications for insider trading bans.
A. A Brief History of Causation
Common law doctrines provided little protection for investors who traded
under conditions of asymmetric information. 1° Chief Justice Marshall
stated the rule early in the 19th century: parties to transactions have no
affirmative duty of disclosure." Each party was left to invest whatever he or
she felt appropriate in seeking information, or to inquire of the other party
to obtain whatever information thought necessary to an informed choice. If
the other party chose not to reply, no duty was breached. This rule was
applied to securities in Britain in Percival v. Wright, 2 even when corporate
directors were dealing with their own shareholders. In a triumph of form
over substance, courts consistently held that directors only owed duties to
the corporation, and not to its shareholders.' 3 With two exceptions, this was
the dominant rule. 4 The effect of the rule was that buyers and sellers were
10. See generally Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 191-95 (7th Cir. 1978); H. MANNE,
supra note 2, at 17-26; Conant, Duties of Disclosure of Corporate Insiders Who Purchase Shares,
46 CORNELL L.Q. 53, 54-58 (1960).
11. Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178, 195 (1817) (contract for sale of tobacco,
where buyer knew of peace treaty between the United States and Britain. Chief Justice Mar-
shall stated that "[i]t would be difficult to circumscribe the contrary doctrine within proper
limits, where the means of intelligence are equally accessible to both parties."). Contra Bow-
man v. Bates, 5 Ky. (2 Bibb) 47 (1810); Frazer v. Gervais, 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 72 (1818)
(plaintiff failing to inform defendant of peace treaty between the United States and Britain has
duty to disclose, or the transaction is void).
12. 2 Ch. 421, 426 (1902).
13. The courts consistently held that the trust placed in directors only applied to the
management of the general affairs of the corporation, including its property. Since directors
did not control the sale of another shareholder's stock, they could not be held liable as trustees
for the sale of the corporation's stock. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 224 (1932); see, e.g., Lank v. Steiner, 43 Del. Ch. 262, 224 A.2d 242
(1966); Board of Comm'rs v. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509 (1873); Seitz v. Frey, 152 Minn. 170, 188
N.W. 266 (1922); Connolly v. Shannon, 105 N.J. Eq. 155, 147 A. 234 (1929), aff'd without op.,
107 N.J. Eq. 180, 151 A. 905 (1930); Crowell v. Jackson, 53 N.J.L. 656, 23 A. 426 (1891);
Carpenter v. Danforth, 52 Barb. 581 (N.Y. 1868). Contra Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co.,
176 Iowa 362, 157 N.W. 929 (1916); Jacobsen v. Yaschik, 249 S.C. 577, 155 S.E.2d 601 (1967).
14. Georgia and Kansas followed a different path. See Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45
S.E. 232 (1903). While the Kansas rule is generally cited as beginning with Hotchkiss v.
Fischer, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (1932), it appears to begin with Stewart v. Harris, 69 Kan.
1987]
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caused harm not by the insider's superior information, but by their own fail-
ure to invest in additional information.
The general rule in market transactions was equally clear: there was no
affirmative duty to disclose inside information in impersonal dealings on ex-
changes." An early Massachusetts case held that an insider's trading
caused no harm to any investor because he had not personally solicited any
sales by other shareholders.16 Implicitly, the court held that no causation
could be shown since there was no reason to believe the insider's buy order
caused any other shareholders to enter the market. Up until the adoption of
the federal securities laws, courts rarely found that nondisclosure was the
cause of any harm in securities dealings. 7
B. Does Insider Trading Cause Harm to Other Investors?
Where an insider in possession of nonpublic information quietly enters an
order with a broker who executes it without identifying his principal, has the
insider's trading caused anyone to trade and to suffer harm? If so, who is
harmed? These are the questions that have bedevilled the courts and com-
mentators for several decades."8 They raise, without acknowledging it, the
questions first raised by Henry Manne."9 Conflicting answers can be found
in the cases. One line of cases finds that investors make decisions to buy or
to sell uninfluenced by the presence of insiders, while another holds that
"but for" the breach of the insider's duty to disclose when trading, unin-
formed traders would not have bought or sold at the prevailing price. To
further compound the difficulties, decisions within the Second Circuit appear
to be in conflict, although that court appears not to have acknowledged this
state of affairs. Perhaps because these decisions do not articulate their argu-
498, 77 P. 277 (1904); see also Blazer v. Black, 196 F.2d 139 (10th Cir. 1952) (applying Kansas
law); Sampson v. Hunt, 222 Kan. 268, 564 P.2d 489 (1977). For an argument that the rule
permitting insider trading is no longer the dominant rule, see Wimberly, Corporate Recovery of
Insider Trading Profits at Common Law, 8 CORP. L. REV. 197 (1985).
15. Jennings, Insider Trading in Corporate Securities: A Survey of Hazards and Disclosure
Obligations Under Rule 10b-5, 10 CORP. PRAC. COMMEN. 111, 114 (1969) ("no common law
case ever held that a duty to disclose inside information existed when the transaction was
effected on a stock exchange"); 3 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 3, § 7.4, at 11.
16. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933).
17. The rare case was Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909), where the insider employed
an agent for an undisclosed principal to solicit shareholders' sales. Id. at 421.
18. One court has characterized causation as "a metaphysical concept and its meaning
may differ in different contexts and the linkage between causation and result necessary to
satisfy the legal concept is not always susceptible of direct proof or mathematical determina-
tion." Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66, 98 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 478 F.2d
1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
19. H. MANNE, supra note 2, at 107-09.
[Vol. 36:863
Insider Trading
ments about causation very clearly, the Supreme Court thus far has not cho-
sen to resolve the conflict.
1. Trading Without Disclosure Causes Harm to All Traders on the
Other Side-Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch
List v. Fashion Park 20 was one of the first insider trading cases to raise the
question of causation in impersonal markets. The Second Circuit looked to
the common law fraud cases for guidance, but cited a face-to-face case in-
volving nondisclosure.2" Following the common law precedents, the court
held that causation was required to establish plaintiff's case.22 The court
stated that "[t]he reason for this requirement ... is to certify that the con-
duct of the defendant actually caused the plaintiff's injury. '23 The court
declined to read "out of the rule so basic an element of tort law as the princi-
ple of causation in fact."
24
The court held that the key elements necessary to prove causation were
the materiality of the information and plaintiff's reliance upon it.25 While
these were necessary elements of causation, they were not sufficient. In
dicta, the court defined reliance: "The proper test is whether the plaintiff
would have been influenced to act differently than he did act if the defendant
had disclosed to him the undisclosed fact. ' 26 While this "but for" notion of
causation was workable in a face-to-face solicitation, it ignored the crucial
20. 340 F.2d 457, 462-63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811, reh'g denied, 382 U.S. 933
(1965). I exclude Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951), aff'd, 235
F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956), which involved nondisclosure in connection with a redemption of a
class of securities by the issuer. In Speed, the buyer was fully revealed, and could be presumed
(correctly) to have superior information. The causation issue was also raised in Joseph v.
Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd, 198 F.2d 883
(2d Cir. 1952), where District Judge Sugarman, conceding insider's sales without disclosure of
bad news, noted the plaintiff's purchases of stock occurred after all insider sales were com-
pleted, and stated that "[a] semblance of privity between the vendor and purchaser of the
security in connection with which the improper act, practice or course of business was invoked
seems to be requisite and it is entirely lacking here." 99 F. Supp. at 706. The court of appeals
affirmed per curiam on the authority of Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952), which implicitly agreed that one not in privity (and
thus not an affected buyer or seller) lacks standing to sue.
21. List, 340 F.2d at 461 (citing Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909)). In Strong, the
defendant did not directly solicit plaintiff's sales, but used an agent for an undisclosed princi-
pal to make the purchases.
22. Id. at 462-63.
23. Id. at 462.
24. Id. at 463. This requirement of causation in fact was repeated in Affiliated Ute Citi-
zens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 154 (1972).
25. List, 340 F.2d at 462-63.
26. Id. at 463.
19871
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element of what induced the plaintiff to enter into a transaction in the first
place.
The dicta of List was destined to become the dominant mode of reasoning
in some courts. When Douglas Aircraft executives learned that earnings
would be well below previous public projections, they informed their under-
writer, Merrill Lynch, even before they had firm information on the size of
the shortfall. Merrill Lynch tipped its best customers, who sold on the news.
The Second Circuit held that where one in a position to obtain nonpublic
information from an issuer had possession of such information, it had a
duty, in the words of its Texas Gulf opinion, to disclose or abstain.2 7 But
violation of that duty did not answer the question of who was harmed by it.
The court cited dicta from List that "the proper test to determine whether
causation in fact has been established in a nondisclosure case is 'whether the
plaintiff would have been influenced to act differently than he did act if the
defendant had disclosed to him the undisclosed fact.' "28 Further, "the Rule
lOb-5 causation in fact requirement is satisfied by plaintiffs' allegation that
they would not have purchased Douglas stock if they had known of the
information withheld by defendants."29 This approach assumed that "but
for" the lack of an announcement by the insiders, there would have been no
trading whatsoever in Douglas shares during the relevant period. While the
ignorance of outside investors is a necessary condition of uninformed trading
on the opposite side from insiders, it is not a sufficient one. Insiders must
make a determination to trade, and the court's conclusion means that the
insider sales caused all buyers to decide to enter the market.
The courts that have followed the Shapiro approach have generally
adopted Shapiro's "but for" method of dealing with causation. While con-
ceding that the insider's actions did not cause the plaintiff, or the plaintiff's
class, to trade on the other side, these courts generally argue that "but for"
the defendant's violation, plaintiffs would not have been harmed.3" Thus, if
27. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495 F.2d 228, 236-37 (2d Cir.
1974).
28. Id. at 239 (citing List, 340 F.2d at 463).
29. Id. at 240.
30. See, e.g., Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 168 n.23 (2d Cir. 1980)
(holding that in open market transactions, the duty to disclose runs to those who traded during
the same period that defendant traded, and sustained "substantial losses" during the period of
insider trading); O'Connor & Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 800, 804
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); Hickman v. Groesbeck, 389 F. Supp. 769 (D. Utah 1974); Lewis v. Bogin,
337 F. Supp. 311, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). See generally 5A A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRAC-
TICE UNDER RULE lOb-5, § 64.02, at 331-49 (1985). "Some [courts] lost sight of the fact that
causation relates to plaintiff's loss and not [to] [sic] his purchase or sale. Consequently, they
erroneously found no causation because the plaintiff would have traded anyway." Id. at 341.
A more sophisticated elaboration of the "but for" justification involves the empirically unsup-
[Vol. 36:863
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the defendant trades, "but for" his nondisclosure, plaintiffs would not have
traded at market prices unaffected by the inside information.
2 Trading Without Disclosure Causes No Harm to Those Acting on
Other Stimuli
The holding of List almost overcame the logical error of its dicta and rep-
resents the second theme in the judicial debate over causation. The case
involved a corporate director who bought shares in his company on undis-
closed information about the possibility of a favorable merger.31 Plaintiff,
who sold to him in a brokerage transaction, did not ask his broker if any
insiders were bidding for his stock, but made a decision, after consulting
with his broker, that his current gain on the shares would be a nice profit to
realize. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision for the de-
fendant, noting that the trial court presumably inferred that plaintiff "was so
desirous of 'the potential five point profit he would make' and so reliant on
knowledge acquired through 'his many dealings in the securities field' that
the identity of the buyer would have been of little or no concern to him."
32
Carried to its logical extreme, the decision could have been read to mean
that since all participants in impersonal markets generally are without
knowledge of the person on the other side of the transaction, and continue to
trade under these conditions, then investors are indifferent to buyer identity,
do not rely upon it, and thus are not caused to trade by insiders.
Other courts reached similar results. In Reynolds v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur, 33 sellers of TGS stock sued insiders who purchased, during the pe-
riod, information about the mineral discovery that was being kept confiden-
tial in order to obtain all necessary mineral rights. Noting that the company
had no duty to disclose to all shareholders while securing the leases, the
court held that the individual defendants had no disclosure duty and, thus,
that their purchases did not cause any damage to the plaintiffs. 34 Implicitly,
the court held that the mere entry of purchase orders by insiders did not
induce any outsider to sell and, thus, no causation could be shown. A simi-
lar district court ruling in Colorado appeared at about the same time. 35
ported assumption that insiders cause issuers to delay release of information in order to facili-
tate insider trading, which causes additional windfall gains and losses to occur, as well as
insider profits. R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW, ch. 8 (1986).
31. 340 F.2d at 460.
32. Id. at 464.
33. 309 F. Supp. 548 (D. Utah 1970), aff'd as modified, 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1972).
34. Id. at 558-59.
35. In Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 315 F. Supp. 42 (D.
Colo. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1973), Judge Doyle wrote:
19871
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Two years after Shapiro, the same question was raised in the Sixth Circuit
in Fridrich v. Bradford. 36 There the defendant had bought on inside infor-
mation, earning a profit of $13,000."' The trial court, following Shapiro,
held that he had breached a duty to the entire market, and set damages at
$361,000, representing the "losses" of all traders who had sold during the
period from the insider's purchase until the disclosure. Focusing more on
the question of causation than did the Second Circuit in Shapiro, the Sixth
Circuit rejected Shapiro's reasoning. 38 The court noted that not even the
pleadings in Shapiro claimed that defendants' insider trading "had any influ-
ence upon their own decision to purchase."39 Rejecting the causation argu-
ment of Shapiro, the court held that "defendants' acts of trading in no way
affected plaintiffs' decision to sell."' 4 If one in possession of inside informa-
tion is under no general duty of disclosure, absent trading activity, it is clear
that all sellers in the market would have suffered windfall losses and all buy-
ers would have windfall gains, if no insiders trade and no disclosure is
made.41
Turning to plaintiff's second theory, the theory of tipping and insider trading,
defendants contend that as a matter of law no claim for relief exists under the facts
alleged by plaintiff. It is doubtful that tipping which results in insider trading on a
national exchange can support a private action for damages under lOb-5. Where a
corporation withholds material information from the public, a certain number of per-
sons trading on the basis of insufficient information will be injured. This injury is not
increased if corporate insiders who possess inside information are trading on the ex-
change at the same time. It is the incomplete information, not insider trading, which
is the proximate cause of the damage to other investors.
315 F. Supp. at 44.
36. 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
37. Id. at 311. Other shares purchased by the defendant for his wife showed an apprecia-
tion of approximately $74,000 prior to the merger that was the material event. Id. Other
defendants also realized trading profits during the relevant period. Id. Dicta appeared to
support a rule limiting recovery to the amount of the insider's profits. Id. at 322 n.33. This
would create a rule conditioning recovery on whether a plaintiff's trade happened to match the
insider's.
38. Id. at 320.
39. Id. at 317. The Fridrich opinion noted that Judge Tenney's opinion in Shapiro re-
jected the defendant's causation analysis, holding that "it is not the act of trading which causes
plaintiffs' injury, it is the act of trading without disclosing material inside information which
causes plaintiff's injury." Id. (quoting Shapiro v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 353 F. Supp. 264, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)) (emphasis omitted).
40. Id. at 318.
41. Addressing the Shapiro argument, the court stated that
The flaw in this logic, we conclude, is that it assumes the very injury which it then
declares compensable. It does so by presupposing that the duty to disclose is abso-
lute, and that the plaintiff is injured when the information is denied him. The duty to
disclose, however, is not an absolute one, but an alternative one, that of either dis-
closing or abstaining from trading. We conceive it to be the act of trading which
essentially constitutes the violation of Rule 10b-5, for it is this which brings the illicit
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Having outlined the disarray of the courts on the question of whether
insider trading causes investors harm in impersonal markets, I will now turn
to arguments that others are harmed beyond those who happen to be trading
in impersonal markets on the other side from insiders. Two groups may be
harmed: issuers or prospective bidders for corporate control from whom
information is taken. Arguments that they are seriously harmed by insider
trading do not withstand scrutiny.
C. Does Insider Trading Cause Harm to Issuers?
Diamond v. Oreamuno42 is perhaps the most famous example of the argu-
ment concerning issuer harm in the reported judicial opinions. Two officers
of an issuer, upon learning of an increase in costs due to a supplier's price
increases, rapidly sold large amounts of stock without disclosure. In a deriv-
ative action seeking to force them to account for their profits, the court cited
general agency rules that agents must account to principals for profits de-
rived from the principal's valuable information.43 While the court could find
no damage to the corporation, it speculated that the defendants might have
damaged the firm's reputation for integrity.' No evidence of actual reputa-
tional damage was offered; indeed, the court argued that an allegation of
damages "has never been considered to be an essential requirement for a
cause of action founded on a breach of fiduciary duty."4 This argument has
been considered and rejected by the two other courts.46 Berle and Means
also took the position that issuers were not harmed by insider trading.47
There are, of course, cases where insider trading may harm issuers, as in
the case of a business opportunity.48 But the difficulty with this argument is
that issuers are not permitted to trade on inside information in selling or
benefit to the insider, and it is this conduct which impairs the integrity of the market
and which is the target of the rule. If the insider does not trade, he has an absolute
right to keep material information secret. Investors must be prepared to accept the
risk of trading in an open market without complete or always accurate information.
Defendants' trading did not alter plaintiffs' expectations when they sold their stock,
and in no way influenced plaintiffs' trading decision.
Id. (citations omitted).
42. 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969). Diamond was not a rule
lOb-5 case, but was brought as a derivative action to compel defendants to account for their
gains. Id. at 496, 248 N.E.2d at 911, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 79.
43. Id. at 497-98, 248 N.E.2d at 911-12, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
44. Id. at 499, 248 N.E.2d at 912-13, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81-82.
45. Id. at 498, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
46. Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 188-96 (7th Cir. 1978); Schein v. Chasen, 313 So.2d
739 (Fla. 1975).
47. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 13, at 223-24.
48. Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949). In Brophy, the court
did not require actual loss in order to grant corporate recovery. See generally id.
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purchasing their own shares. Furthermore, allowing traders to recover for
any "harm" to the corporate issuer is hardly an efficient method of protect-
ing the property rights of the corporation in its own information. 9
Arguments that insider trading harms issuers generally revert to claims
that corporate information is the property of the shareholders.i ° This state-
ment, of course, begs the question, and it is not clear that shareholders
would not prefer to assign property rights in information to managers in
order to reduce other compensation costs.5" These arguments have been
well developed elsewhere, and will not be repeated here.52
D. Does Insider Trading Cause Harm to Bidders for Corporate Control?
Bans on informed trading in the takeover area are a relatively recent de-
velopment.53 Prior to the adoption of the Williams Act, a bidder could ac-
quire an unlimited amount of stock without any disclosure beyond that
required by section 16(a).54 Market information concerning the identity of
prospective buyers and sellers and the intensity of their demand has never
been treated as inside information for purposes of rule lOb-5.55 Thus, any-
one learning of the bidder's activities was free to trade on that information,
just as specialists are free to trade on information about limit orders con-
tained in their order books.
56
49. Carlton & Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 889-90
(1983).
50. Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547, 549 (1970)
(citing Jennings, Book Review, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1229, 1234 (1967)).
51. See H. MANNE, supra note 2, at 131-45; Carlton & Fischel, supra note 49, at 869-72;
Haddock & Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 1449 (1987).
52. See authorities cited supra notes 2, 48 & 51.
53. Informed trading by the bidder should not be characterized as insider trading because
the information does not come from "within" the issuer, but relates to the identity of present
and prospective buyers of the issuer's securities. Where specialists trade on similar knowledge
obtained from their limit order books, it is not characterized as inside information, nor is it
ever suggested that such trading violates insider trading rules, although market makers do earn
abnormal returns on the information in their limit order books. Conroy & Winkler, Informa-
tional Differences Between Limit and Market Orders for a Market Maker, 16 J. FIN. & QUAN-
TITATIVE ANALYSIS 703 (1981).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1982).
55. In General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., 403 F.2d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. de-
nied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969), Judge Friendly stated: "We know of no rule of law, applicable at
the time, that a purchaser of stock, who was not an 'insider' and had no fiduciary relation to a
prospective seller, had any obligation to reveal circumstances that might raise a seller's de-
mands and thus abort the sale."
56. See Barry, The Economics of Outside Information and Rule lob-5, 129 U. PA. L. REV.
1307, 1381-85 (1981); cf Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 231 n.14 (1980) (rejecting
arguments that those with regular access to market information are insiders by virtue of the
access alone, without a relationship between parties that creates duties).
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Bidders apparently found that high volume purchases by a single buyer
signalled the market and revealed their intentions, causing stock prices to
rise. In order to avoid such signals, bidders began to enter into agreements
with certain investors to "warehouse" target securities for later delivery.
Typically, a bidder would request a mutual fund or similar institution to
acquire stock in a target, with the assurance that the bidder would take and
pay for the shares on a "most favored shareholder" basis, thus assuring the
institution the highest price paid by the bidder to anyone." Since institu-
tions plausibly could buy large blocks for investment purposes, the signalling
effect of such actions was weakened. The utility of these arrangements to
bidders was frustrated by the provisions of the Williams Act, which treated
any such arrangement as a "group" that had "acquired" the target's shares
at the time of the agreement if either bidder or institution then held any
target shares.5 8
The logic of Dirks v. SEC59 and Chiarella v. United States' made it ap-
parent that traditional rationales for insider trading rules would not neces-
sarily apply where the information was derived from a bidder and where no
formal warehousing arrangement was created. While the courts sustained
criminal indictments based on trading under these circumstances, the opin-
ions increasingly concluded that damage suits would be frustrated by the
fact that target investors were owed no duties by bidders until schedule 13D
filings were required, ten days after the bidder obtained 5% of the target's
shares. The harm, if any, was to bidders, and they were not generally com-
plaining. In United States v. Newman,6 the Second Circuit failed to discuss
57. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 234; E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL 25 (1973); Flom, Warehousing, I INST. ON SEC. REG. 79 (1970);
Thomas, Warehousing, 3 REV. SEC. REG. 975 (1970); Wander, Takeovers. Preparing the At-
tack, 2 INST. ON SEC. REG. 237, 241 (1971).
58. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, amended by Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-
439, § 2, 82 Stat. 454. § 13(d)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3) (1982); see GAF Corp. v. Milstein,
453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972). But see Bath Indus. v. Blot, 427
F.2d 97, 109 (7th Cir. 1970) (treating group arrangement as being within § 13(d) only when
group has 10% and agrees as a group to acquire additional shares). The SEC adopted the GAF
approach in rule 13d-5(b)(1).
59. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). Dirks held that there was no duty to forego trading on material
nonpublic information obtained from an issuer's employees where the information was not
privileged and (in puzzling dicta) where the tippers were not motivated by monetary gain. Id.
at 662-67.
60. 445 U.S. at 222. Chiarella held that no lob-5 violation occurs in the absence of a
breach of a duty that arises from a specific relationship and that there is no general duty
"between all participants in market transactions to forego actions based on material, nonpublic
information." Id. at 233.
61. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981). "In a tender-offer situation, the effect of increased activity
in purchases of the target company's shares is, similarly, to drive up the price of the target
company's shares; but this effect is damaging to the offering company because the tender offer
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harm to investors at all, and offered only a weak and superficial explanation
of how insider trading might harm bidders by driving the target's stock price
up. It was only a short step to the ultimate holding that target shareholders
were not the protected class where insiders breached a duty of confidentiality
owed to a bidder. Thus, target shareholders could not sue for damages
based on violations of rule lOb-5. 62
In 1980, following Chiarella, the SEC adopted rule 14e-3, which bans
trading on undisclosed material information about impending bids where the
information is obtained from the bidder, target, or agents of either bidder or
target.63 The rule prohibits bidders themselves from tipping others about
their intent to make a bid, thus closing the door on informal warehousing. 
6
At the same time, the Commission made it clear that it was not relying on
the "theft of information" rationale to justify this ban. 65 The rationale given
by the Commission was not based on the resulting harm to either bidders or
traders, but rather on the old (and since rejected) "unfairness of informa-
tional asymmetries" argument.66
II. THE ECONOMICS OF CAUSATION
Having described the logical morass of legal theories about how insider
trading causes harm, this Article now focuses on financial economics for
will appear commensurately less attractive and the activity may cause it to abort." Id. at 17-18
(citation omitted).
62. Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025
(1984).
63. 17 C.F.R. 240.14e-3 (1986) (effective October 12, 1980); see Exchange Act Release
No. 17,120, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,646 (Sept. 4, 1980). While
the sequence of the text suggests adoption in response to the Morgan Stanley opinion, it was
clear that the Commission saw the handwriting on the wall after Chiarella, and began a
rulemaking proceeding to fill the regulatory gap that it anticipated.
64. 17 C.F.R. 240.14e-3(d)(1) (1986).
65. Oddly enough, the House report on the Insider Trading Sanctions Act noted adoption
of rule 14e-3 and approved it on a "theft of nonpublic information" basis. H.R. REP. No. 355,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1983). But the Commission did not limit rule 14e-3 to theft of
information cases. Rule 14e-3(d)(l) prohibits bidders from communicating their intentions
concerning bids to those who might act upon them by purchasing target shares.
66. Exchange Act Release No. 17,120, supra note 63, at 83,457. The Commission stated:
"This practice results in unfair disparities in market information and market disruption." Id.
(footnote omitted). The disruption referred to was that "[s]uch purchases may result in rapid
and unexplained price and volume movements in the subject company's and the bidder's secur-
ities." Id. at 83,457 n.30. The unfairness argument was finally and ultimately rejected in
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657 (1983). But in approving rule 14e-3, the House committee
report on the Insider Trading Sanctions Act quoted Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Infor-
mational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REv. 322, 346 (1979),
who noted that insider trading prohibitions "rest on considerations of equity." H.R. REP. No.
355, supra note 65, at 5.
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theories and evidence about investor behavior. "Causation" is, of course, a
legal and not an economic concept. 67 But economists' descriptions of inves-
tor choices and behavior can illuminate the legal issue. Absent possession of
information they believe is not shared with other traders, rational investors
are indifferent as between a great many stocks carrying the same risk and
expected returns. Because of the presence of a large number of financial
instruments that are perfect substitutes, elasticities of demand and supply
are extremely high over very large ranges. This elasticity generally will not
cause investors to be influenced by trading volume, whether by insiders or by
others, in any particular security. Only specialists and market-makers will
be caused to buy or sell by insider activity in most cases. Where insider
trading is detected, it reveals valuable information to other traders, who will
enter on the same side of the market as the insiders and thus can claim no
harm. Further, most insider trading will cause no compensable harm either
to issuers or bidders for corporate control.
A. Efficient Capital Market Theory
Theories and evidence about investor choices and behavior center on how
participants in capital markets process new information. It would be redun-
dant to repeat all of the evidence in support of what Michael Jensen has
called one of the best established propositions in all of the social sciences:
the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis.68 Beginning with research that
established that stock price movements are unpredictable, researchers were
able to infer that stock markets were efficient in a weak form-that nothing
in the sequence of past stock prices enabled us to predict future price move-
ments.69 From that, researchers proceeded to test stronger claims of market
67. Production theory has been the source of economic descriptions of actions between
tortfeasors and victims generally. Thus, when the acts of two or more actors are necessary, as
in the production of a tort, economists characterize this as a joint output, without allocating
causal responsibility to either party. See generally Haddock & Curran, An Economic Theory of
Comparative Negligence, 14 J. LEG. STUD. 49 (1985).
68. Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence, 4, No. 2 MIDLAND CORP.
FIN. J. 6, 11 (Summer 1986).
69. For a general account of the early work, see J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK
MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 70-79 (1973). The origination of the random-walk the-
ory has been credited to L. BACHELIER, THEORIE DE LA SPECULATION (1900), reprinted in
THE RANDOM CHARACTER OF STOCK MARKET PRICES 17 (P. Cootner ed. 1964) (English
trans.). Other early corroborating work includes: Cowles & Jones, Some A Posteriori
Probabilities in Stock Market Action, 5 ECONOMETRICA 280 (1937); Kendall, The Analysis of
Economic Time Series (pt. 1: prices), 96 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC'Y 11 (1953); Working, A Ran-
dom Difference Series for Use in the Analysis of Time Series, 29 AM. J. STATISTICAL ANAL. 11
(1934). Modern work began in 1959 with two important papers: Osborne, Brownian Motion
in the Stock Market, 7 OPERATIONS REs. 145 (1959) and Roberts, Stock Market "Patterns"
and Financial Analysis.- Methodological Suggestions, 14 J. FIN. 1 (1959). Following Osborne
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efficiency. The semi-strong form asserted that all publicly available informa-
tion about issuers was reflected in stock prices, while the strong form as-
serted that all such information, public or not, was reflected.7 °
Tests of the semi-strong form provide voluminous support for the hypoth-
esis.7 1 There is, nevertheless, some contradictory evidence.7 2 Thus far, evi-
dence does not support an alternative theory. Those who make general
challenges to the semi-strong form may make anecdotal arguments, 73 or ar-
gue that market participants sometimes play sub-games so that some stock
prices inaccurately reflect "intrinsic values,",74 or that bargains can be found
and Roberts, others devised tests of this randomness, using more extensive bodies of data.
Moore, Some Characteristics of Changes in Common Stock Prices, in THE RANDOM CHARAC-
TER OF STOCK MARKET PRICES 139 (P. Cootner ed. 1964); Fama, The Behavior of Stock
Market Prices, 38 J. Bus. 34 (1965); Granger & Morgenstern, Spectral Analysis of New York
Stock Market Prices, 16 KYKLOS 1 (Spring 1963). For a more rigorous formal proof of the
independence of successive stock prices changes, see Samuelson, Proof that Properly Antici-
pated Prices Fluctuate Randomly, 6 IND'L MGMT. REV. 41 (1965). A simplified and
nonmathematical summary of Samuelson's proof appears in B. LEV, FINANCIAL STATEMENT
ANALYSIS: A NEW APPROACH 217 (1974); cf Mandelbrot, Forecasts of Future Prices, Unbi-
ased Markets, and "Martingale" Models, 39 J. Bus. 242 (1966); SAMUELSON, Proof that Prop-
erly Discounted Present Values of Assets Vibrate Randomly, 4 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI.,
369 (1973). For a summary of attempts to reject the weak form of the efficient capital markets
hypothesis, see J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, supra at 70-83.
70. J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, supra note 69, at 71.
71. Major reviews of the literature include Fama, Efficient Capital Markets.: A Review of
Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970); Friend, The Economic Consequences of the
Stock Market, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 212 (1972); Grossman, On the Efficiency of Competitive
Stock Markets Where Traders Have Diverse Information, 31 J. FIN. 573 (1976); Comment, The
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the Regulation of the Securities
Industry, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1031 (1977). The evidence does not go unchallenged, however.
See, e.g., Gordon & Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information and Securities Re-
search, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761 (1985); Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A
Proposal for Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 276-89 (1983); Wang, Some Arguments that
the Stock Market is Not Efficient, 19 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 341 (1986).
72. Several studies show that some traders may earn systematically abnormal returns by
following investment advisers' recommendations. Bjerring, Lakonishok & Vermaelen, Stock
Prices and Financial Analysts' Recommendations, 38 J. FIN. 187 (1983); Black, Yes, Virginia.
There is Hope: Tests of the Value Line Ranking System, 29 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 10 (Sept.-Oct.
1973). Other research has found that stocks with lower price-earnings (P-E) ratios tend to out
perform stocks with higher P-E ratios, after adjusting for risk. Basu, Investment Performance
of Common Stocks in Relation to Their Price-Earnings Ratios: A Test of the Efficient Market
Hypothesis, 32 J. FIN. 663 (1977). Other studies have found that higher risk stocks are over-
priced because they generate lower returns per unit of risk. R. BREALEY, AN INTRODUCTION
TO RISK AND RETURN FROM COMMON STOCKS 42-54 (1969). Some evidence suggests that
the market does not respond with complete efficiency to some forms of public information.
Givoly & Lakonishok, The Information Content of Financial Analysts' Forecasts of Earnings:
Some Evidence on Semi-Strong Inefficiency, 1 J. ACCTG. & ECON. 165 (1979).
73. See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 71, at 274.




in supposedly efficient markets.75 The most recent criticism, that of Gordon
and Kornhauser, appears merely to be that the tools used to test market
efficiency are not necessarily accurate. 76 But none of these studies challenge
the general proposition that markets are effective, if not perfect, processors
of information about the value of firms." Further, little evidence challenges
the conclusion that markets are unbiased predictors of future values,7 8 and
that is the most important feature of this literature for purposes of this
Article.
The strong form of the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis argues that
stock prices reflect all available information about firms, so that gains are
unavailable even to insiders. However, empirical tests have demonstrated
that insiders do indeed earn above-normal returns on their trading.79 On the
other hand, the semi-strong form now appears supported by this evidence,
75. Wang, supra note 71, at 377-94 (convertible debt that sells below conversion value and
dual purpose closed-end mutual funds that sell below net asset value).
76. Gordon & Kornhauser and Wang argue that the Capital Assets Pricing Model
(CAPM) is not adequate to test the propositions it examines. Gordon & Kornhauser, supra
note 71; Wang, supra note 71, at 366-75. A broader version of the CAPM is set out by Ibbot-
son, Diermeier & Siegel, The Demand for Capital Market Returns: A New Equilibrium Theory,
40 No. 1 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 22 (Jan.-Feb. 1984).
77. It is important to focus for a moment on the conditions required for efficient securities
markets. Information must be available to a sufficient number of investors so that ample trad-
ing can take place on new information to drive prices to the correct level. Transaction costs
must be reasonable, in the sense that brokerage fees cannot be so high that they preclude
trading on relatively modest bits of information. Finally, there can be no evidence of consis-
tent superiority or inferiority by major market participants, eliminating the possibility that you
can fool all of the people all of the time. See generally J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, supra note
69, at 80; Fama, supra note 71. It is generally agreed that these conditions are satisfied for
companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange, where trading volume is heavy enough to
justify research on all listed companies, and where a number of analysts are likely to follow
each firm's stock. J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, supra note 69, at 80, 98-99, 109; H. KRIPKE,
THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 85 (1979).
But see Barry, The Economics of Outside Information and Rule lOb-5, 129 U. PA. L. REV.
1302, 1349 (1981) (arguing that even the NYSE may not be efficient for smaller listed compa-
nies not closely followed by major investment media).
78. Possible exceptions to this statement include the small firm anomaly, discussed infra
note 100, stocks with low price-earnings ratios, stocks with low prices, and stocks selling below
liquidation value. Wang, supra note 71, at 353-54. See generally Keim, The CAPM and Equity
Return Regularities, 42 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 19 (May-June 1986).
79. See, e.g., Baesel & Stein, The Value of Information: Inferences from the Probability of
Insider Trading, 14 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 553, 567-69 (1979) (ordinary insiders
earned positive premium relative to uniform traders); accord Finnerty, Insiders and Market
Efficiency, 31 J. FIN. 1141, 1142 (1976); Jaffe, The Effect of Regulation Changes on Insider
Trading, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 93, 114 (1974); Jaffe, Special Information and Insider
Trading, 47 J. Bus. 410 (1974) [hereinafter Jaffe, Special Information]; Keown & Pinkerton,
Merger Announcements and Insider Trading Activity: An Empirical Investigation, 36 J. FIN.
855 (1981); Lorie & Niderhoffer, Predictive and Statistical Properties of Insider Trading, 11 J.
LAW & ECON. 35, 52 (1968); Pratt & DeVere, Relationship Between Insider Trading and Rates
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since the most recent study shows that it is unlikely that outsiders can gain
from emulating insiders' trades.80
The significance of these findings can be stated simply. Where stock mar-
kets are efficient, public announcements will immediately affect the price of a
security, without the necessity of any trading, as traders rapidly adjust reser-
vation prices to reflect the new information. Sophisticated traders will real-
ize that there is little reason to trade on the basis of this announcement, to
the extent the information contained in these filings is unambiguous in its
significance to investors. Ambiguous information that is publicly available
may have trading value, but it may require expenditures of considerable re-
sources to enable traders to extract significance (and therefore value) from
it.
s1
Only unsophisticated traders might believe that they can win at this stage
by "beating the market." They are naive to hold this belief, and can hardly
be described as "prudent" in expending resources to trade on information
that has no value. Sophisticated traders, on the other hand, can confidently
alter their portfolios knowing that the market reflects all of this information.
of Return for NYSE Common Stocks, 1960-1966, in MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN INVEST-
MENT MANAGEMENT 268, 279 (J. Lorie & R. Brealey eds. 1972).
80. Seyhun, Insiders' Profits, Costs of Trading, and Market Efficiency, 16 J. FIN. ECON.
189, 210-11 (1986). Seyhun's study rejects the conclusions of earlier studies, suggesting that a
trading rule could be developed that allowed above normal profits on emulating insiders'
trades. Id. at 210; see, e.g., Jaffe, Special Information, supra note 79, at 427 (outsiders can
profit by prompt use of insiders intensive trading); Lone & Niederhoffer, supra note 79, at 52
(proper and prompt alaysis of insider trading can be profitable). Seyhun's study does not reject
the evidence that market makers also earn abnormal returns, since they have access to nonpub-
lic information about future transactions, in their limit order books. Another study of insider
trading reached opposite conclusions. Givoly & Palmon, Insider Trading and the Exploitation
of Inside Information: Some Empirical Evidence, 58 J. Bus. 69 (1985). These authors claim
that insider gains in the absence of the announcement of significant firm news can be explained
on the basis of traders' adjustments in response to the observation of insider trading. The
difficulties with this argument involve the anonymity of traders. See Copeland & Galai, Infor-
mation Effects on the Bid-Ask Spread, 38 J. FIN. 1457, 1459 (1983). Further difficulties with
the signalling argument are apparent from the fact that insiders' profits do not vary with the
size of the trade, although larger trades might be thought to send stronger signals. Givoly &
Palmon, supra at 79-80.
81. Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 585
(1984), use the example of an innovative securities offering, which investors may not fully
understand, or appreciate the value of, at first offering. I have made the same point with
respect to takeover defenses; that investors have difficulty assessing the significance (and value)
of innovative shark repellent amendments until the market has some experience with their
effects on bids. Carney, Two-Tier Tender Offers and Shark Repellents, 4, No. 2 MIDLAND
CORP. FIN. J. 48 (1986). Recently, an issuer has made similar claims of a lack of market
understanding in pricing a new issue on a discounted cash flow basis rather than on a multiple
of earnings. Coke Bottling Firm Chief Defends Price of Offering, The Atlanta Constitution,
Dec. 2, 1986, at BI, col. 2.
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Indeed, that has been one of the goals of the securities laws-to build confi-
dence in the securities markets.
B. The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency
The point here is not to test whether or not capital markets are efficient,
but to examine the processes by which prices reflect information of various
types. This Article will follow the model of Gilson and Kraakman, which
attempted to link the three forms of the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothe-
sis with the mechanisms used to distribute information. 2 As these authors
pointed out, to say that sooner or later prices will reflect certain information
is not by itself very interesting; the most critical question is "How long does
it take?"
83
Weak form market efficiency presumes that information is readily avail-
able to all traders. This includes old information, such as price histories, as
well as information about current events, such as important news items. In-
deed, even news stories about particular firms affect prices too rapidly to
support trading profits. 84 In these instances, no particular trading seems re-
quired to move stock prices to adjust to new widely distributed information.
Thus, public announcements of Federal Reserve Board policy changes can
be met with instantaneous changes in the reservation prices of traders, just as
major company announcements can.8" Gilson and Kraakman point out that
where news is incomplete, uncertainty about future prospects will remain
until events or announcements resolve the uncertainty. During this period, a
certain amount of trading activity will occur to fine-tune the price to reflect
the consensus of traders' assessments.
8 6
Semi-strong form market efficiency shifts from "publicly distributed" in-
formation to "publicly available" information that is not known to all mar-
ket participants. For example, experts pore over government filings by
issuers, such as SEC reports, to analyze this information. The resulting mar-
ket insights might be available only to such experts. Studies support the
assertion that stock markets also reflect this information with such rapidity
that no extraordinary trading profits are generally available.8 7 Since virtu-
82. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 81, at 565-643.
83. Id. at 560.
84. Id. at 568 n.59 (citing Lloyd-Davies & Canes, Stock Prices and the Publication of
Second-Hand Information, 51 J. Bus. 43, 55 (1978)).
85. Waud, Public Interpretation of Federal Reserve Discount Rate Changes: Evidence on
the "'Announcement Effect," 38 ECONOMETRICA 231, 232-33 (1970). There is evidence that
the Federal Reserve Board changes are in fact anticipated by the market. Id. at 248-49.
86. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 81, at 581-85.
87. Ball & Brown, An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers, 6 J. ACCT.
RES. 159 (1968) (market anticipates income statements before they are reported); Brown &
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ally all such disclosures are historical rather than forward-looking, they pro-
vide only weak insights about the future performance of a firm. Because this
information is not readily available to all traders (at least in a useful form),
price adjustments to such information rely on trading by a minority of mar-
ket traders-informed professionals.88 Gilson and Kraakman explain this in
terms of the trading volume controlled by market professionals, but volume
arguments, standing alone, raise serious questions about market efficiency. s9
The evidence to date suggests that all stocks with similar beta coefficients are
treated as fungible by investors, so demand for any given security is perfectly
elastic, absent special information about an issuer.9° In this context, volume
is relevant to price only to the extent that it signals traders that someone is
apparently acting on superior information.91
Thus far, this Article has described the forms of market efficiency gener-
ally accepted by the SEC when designing an integrated disclosure system
and rules governing shelf registrations.92 Here, there seems to be a consen-
Kennelly, The Informational Content of Quarterly Earnings: An Extension and Some Further
Evidence, 45 J. Bus. 403, 414 (1972) (same results); Fama, supra note 71, at 387-88; Benston,
The Effectiveness and Effects of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure Requirements, in ECONOMIC
POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 23 (H. Manne ed. 1969). Where
information is revealed that has ambiguous significance for future periods, price adjustments
may be slower. Thus, "surprise" announcements about earnings, and revisions of financial
analysts' forecasts may entail adjustments over several months. For a summary of studies
demonstrating price adjustments, see generally Wang, supra note 71, at 364 nn.60-61. The
statement that superior returns from analysis generally are not available should be taken nar-
rowly, in the sense that "on average" such returns are not available. Some participants may
earn superior returns from superior analytical skills, but on average, additional investment in
financial analysis will earn only market rates on resources so invested. See J. LoRIE & M.
HAMILTON, supra note 68, at 100-05; B. LEV, supra note 69, at 121-24.
88. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 81, at 571 n.69 (citing Dann, Mayers & Rabb, Trad-
ing Rules, Large Blocks and the Speed of Price Adjustment, 4 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 18-21 (1977) (a
study showing rapid market adjustments to the news of block trades)).
89. As few as 2200 investors or traders are reported to account for 88% of New York
Stock Exchange trading activity. A Discussion of Corporate Financial Information 2, No. I
MIDLAND CORP. FIN. J. 40, 45 (Spring 1984) [hereinafter Stern] (discussion by J. Stern).
90. See discussion of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), infra notes 96-106 and
accompanying text. Support for the notion of perfectly elastic demand curves for common
stocks appears in Scholes, The Market for Securities: Substitution Versus Price Pressure and
the Effects of Information on Share Prices, 45 J. Bus. 179 (1972). For a recent study suggesting
a downward sloping demand curve for stocks, see Shleifer, infra note 101.
91. See, e.g., Financial Industrial Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973), where a mutual fund reached a decision to buy
Douglas stock at a time when Douglas' underwriter had tipped some institutions about forth-
coming bad news about Douglas' earning. "Plaintiff's officer who was instrumental in reach-
ing the decision to buy was surprised at the large number of shares offered [when plaintiff
began buying], and he ordered that purchases stop." Id.
92. See, e.g., SEC Securities Act Release No. 6338, Special Bull. No. 956, Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. No. 926 (Second Extra Edition) (CCH) 5, 14-15 (Aug. 13, 1981); SEC Securities Act
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sus among lawyers and economists that markets are fully informed about the
data disclosed. Investors can confidently rely on this information when trad-
ing in securities in efficient markets, without undertaking further analysis on
their own. With respect to this data, at least, stocks are assumed to be fairly
priced, in the sense that there is no systematic bias. Insiders who are aware
of this information can trade freely on it, confident that the courts will not
find any unlawful informational advantage over other market participants.
Moving from information that is publicly available to firm-specific infor-
mation not formally announced or released, price adjustments become more
complex, and less well documented. Market participants act as if markets
are not efficient, and as if information can produce gains. This has been
described as the paradox of efficient markets; in order for them to function,
participants must disbelieve in the hypothesis.93 Expenditures on securities
research may provide more or less perfect substitutes for much inside infor-
mation. There are reports that traders and analysts spend as much as $600
million seeking information.94 Securities analysts attempt to duplicate inside
information by researching sources identical or similar to those providing
insiders with their insights. Suppliers, customers, and competitors are all
potential sources.95
C. The Capital Asset Pricing Model
The claims made in the empirical literature cited in this Article rely on a
model of investor choice that requires some simplified explanation. The
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is based on modem portfolio theory.
Simply stated, modem portfolio theory teaches investors to eliminate all risk
related to specific firms through diversification,96 and to select the level of
Release No. 6235, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,649, at 83,484 (Sept.
2, 1980).
93. Grossman & Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70
AM. ECON. REV. 393, 404 (1980). If there were no gains from investments in information,
traders would not invest in research activities, and prices could not remain efficiently set. Sim-
ilarly, if traders believed that market efficiency precluded profits from seeking information,
markets would oscillate between efficiency and inefficiency, since traders would discover dis-
parities between market prices and their own assessments of value, which would provide incen-
tives for research. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 81, at 577.
94. A Discussion of Corporate Financial Information, 2, No. 1 MIDLAND CORP. FIN. J. 40,
64 (Spring 1984) (discussion by Weare).
95. Stern, supra note 89, at 55.
96. Risk related to the events affecting a specific firm is quantified as the "alpha" factor by
financial economists. It is also called "unsystematic" risk. See generally R. BREALEY & S.
MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 170, 172 (2d ed. 1984). For the role of diversi-
fication in eliminating this risk, see generally id. at 123-26; Bines, Modern Portfolio Theory and
Investment Management Law: Refinement of Legal Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 721, 752
(1976); Modigliani & Pogue, An Introduction to Risk and Return, 30 FIN. ANAL. J. 68, 76-79
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risk and return by mixing risk-free investments, risky investments, and bor-
rowings in a manner that maximizes personal utility.97
The CAPM begins with the notion that there is some risk that cannot be
diversified away; all stocks, for example, are subject to market risk: factors
that affect virtually all stock prices in the same direction, if not in the same
magnitude. Risk and return generally are measured against the returns
available from holding a portfolio consisting of (or comparable to) the entire
market.98 The risk premium demanded by investors can be observed as the
difference between the expected yield on the market portfolio and on a risk-
free portfolio of Treasury bonds. Thus, if one's portfolio is less variable than
the market, the expected rate of return will be less than the market rate, but
always greater than the risk-free rate available on Treasury bonds. Where
one's portfolio is more variable than the market, a higher rate return than
the market rate will be required.99 The portion of risk represented by the
relationship between the riskiness of the market and the riskiness of a partic-
ular security is called the "beta" factor. "
This model also applies to individual securities. If markets were perfectly
efficient, returns on all stocks would lie along a line that positively correlated
market risk and return.' 0 Assuming portfolio diversification and knowl-
(1974) (noting that perfect diversification means that over time the return from unsystematic
risk will average zero).
97. See generally R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 96, at 140-58; J. LORE & M.
HAMILTON, supra note 69, at 171-97; W. SHARPE, PORTFOLIO THEORY AND CAPITAL MAR-
KETS (1970).
98. Sharpe, A Simplified Model for Portfolio Analysis, 9 J. MGMT. Sci. 277 (1973); Sharpe,
Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425
(1964).
99. See generally Modigliani & Pogue, supra note 96.
100. See generally R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 96, at 164-73; Langbein & Posner,
Social Investing and the Law of Trusts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 72, 79-80 (1980); Modigliani &
Pogue, supra note 96, at 68-69.
101. For examples of studies demonstrating this relationship, see R. BREALEY & S. MY-
ERS, supra note 96, at 155 (citing Fama & MacBeth, Risk, Return and Equilibrium: Empirical
Tests, 81 J. POL. ECON. 607 (1973)); Black, Jensen & Scholes, The CapitalAsset Pricing Model:
Some Empirical Tests, in STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF CAPITAL MARKETS 79 (M. Jensen ed.
1972); Blume & Friend, A New Look at the Capital Asset Pricing Model, 28 J. FIN. 19 (1973);
Modigliani & Pogue, supra notes 96, 98-99. This is not to suggest that the CAPM is without
some difficulties. One body of evidence suggests that returns on small firms seem to exceed
returns required by the market risk associated with their securities. See generally R. BREALEY
& S. MYERS, supra note 96, at 371 n.10; T. COPELAND & J. WESTON, FINANCIAL THEORY
AND CORPORATE POLICY, 204-09 (2d ed. 1983); J. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
AND POLICY, 54-64 (6th ed. 1983); Schwert, Size and Stock Returns and Other Empirical
Irregularities, 12 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1983); Reinganum, Misspecification of Capital Asset Pricing:
Empirical Anomalies Based on Earnings' Yields and Market Values, 9 J. FIN. EON. 19 (1981);
Roll, A Possible Explanation of the Small Firm Effect, 36 J. FIN. 879 (1981). Roll argues that
the small firm effect occurs when measurements of market risk understate the true market risk
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edge that all stocks are priced in efficient markets, and a consequent perfect
correlation between expected returns and market risk, investors should be
indifferent between holding any two securities with the same beta. Stated
differently, all stocks with the same beta are perfect substitutes, absent inside
information. This phenomena has been expressed in one text with the apho-
rism: "Seen one stock, seen them all."'10 2 It also means that the demand
curve for any given stock is likely to be perfectly elastic over a very wide
range. 1
03
Myron Scholes offered proof of this proposition in a seminal article testing
the price effects of news of secondary offerings."° Scholes found that, con-
trary to conventional (and underwriters') wisdom, a large increase in the
supply of a particular security available in the market had no observable
effect on price. Price declines were attributable solely to the information
effect of secondary offerings, namely, that insiders were selling out. Scholes'
proof was based on his observations that price declines were observed in all
secondary offerings, but were unrelated to the size of the secondary offer-
ing.105 The major implication of this study for insider trading is that an
increase in the volume of buying or selling in any particular security should
have no impact on its price, unless traders believe some new information
about the issuer exists.'0 6
of trading a portfolio of small firms' stocks in thinner markets. At the other end of the spec-
trum, expected returns are seen to decline as prices for particular stocks are bid up when they
are selected as components of the Standard & Poor's 500 Stock Index. Shleifer, Do Demand
Curvesfor Stocks Slope Down?, 41 J. FIN. 579 (1986). Shleifer's data shows that when a firm is
included in the Standard & Poor's 500 its price increases by nearly 3%, apparently due to
increased demand from index funds. But Shleifer's study is equally consistent with an upward
sloping supply curve, where some sellers have a reservation price above the current market, so
a higher price is required to induce them to sell their shares. Indeed, Shlcifer explains part of
the price rise in terms of the costly portfolio adjustments that must be made by sellers, but
believes this accounts for no more than one half of 1% of the selling price. Id. at 587. Shleifer
suggests that the phenomenon is partly explained by differences of opinion among investors
about the value of any security. Id. at 589.
102. R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 96, at 278.
103. For most traders, we would predict that the supply curve will be equally elastic. But
to the extent that views of individual traders vary from the consensus, their reservation prices
may be higher than the current market price for a particular stock they hold. For investors
who follow a buy and hold strategy, considerations such as transaction costs, including recog-
nition of taxable gains, may also come into play. See generally Carney, Shareholder Coordina-
tion Costs, Shark Repellents, and Takeout Mergers: The Case Against Fiduciary Duties, 1983
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 341, 384-86; Carney, supra note 81, at 51.
104. See generally Scholes, The Market for Securities: Substitution Versus Price Pressure
and the Effects of Information on Share Prices, 45 J. Bus. 179, 200-04 (1972).
105. Id.
106. This is consistent with the findings of Givoly & Palmon, supra note 80, at 79-80, that
insider profits do not vary with the size of the trade. If larger trades moved prices to a greater
extent, we would expect larger insider trades to result in larger post-trade price movements.
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D. The Economics of Insider Trading
0
What are the implications of this knowledge for the theory that insider
trading causes investors harm? The model predicts that investors generally
will be indifferent about holding particular stocks, as long as the securities
they do hold satisfy their requirements for market risk. Investors can confi-
dently assume that all securities with similar betas carry similar prices for
their expected returns. Most investors can also assume that they personally
possess no information of any value that they should trade upon. Trading
decisions, then, will either be driven by the need to invest additional funds,
or by exogenous changes, probably in personal circumstances, that require
portfolio adjustments such as liquidations, changes in risk, or expansions of
portfolios.1 7 Under these circumstances, it is not certain that any outsiders
are drawn into the market by insider trading; in anonymous markets, the
decisions of outsiders are made independent of insider trading. Only special-
ists and market-makers committed to taking the other side of unmatched
transactions must trade because of insider trading.
Because detection of trading activities by market participants, and the sig-
nals they obtain from such detection, are so critical to the impact of insider
trading, the following discussion is divided between undetected and detected
trading.
1. Undetected Trading
Modern portfolio theory suggests that rational investors believe that they
will find no bargains in efficient securities markets, and that an examination
of past versus present stock prices and trading patterns will disclose nothing
useful. For an investor building an optimal portfolio, the only relevant data
is the beta of any given security.
The implication of this theory and the empirical evidence that supports it
is that, absent signalling effects, insider trading does not cause investors to
engage in transactions in impersonal markets. Since insiders have every rea-
son to conceal the signals of their presence in the markets, generally there is
no reason to expect insider trading to cause transactions.log Insiders, in part
107. See generally G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 275-81 (3d ed. 1966).
108. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting. A Critical Response to the "Chicago School,"
1986 DUKE L.J. 628, 635. Nor does insider trading prevent transactions, or preempt other
traders, as suggested in Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal
Stock Markets: Who Is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule lOb-i?, 54 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1217 (1981). Wang's argument concerning trader preemption begins with an
example of a closely held firm, and is extended erroneously into impersonal securities markets,
through his "Law of Conservation of Securities." Id. at 1233-36. Wang's argument depends
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because of legal prohibitions, trade anonymously. I° 9 Indeed, there is evi-
dence that insider trading generally provides only weak signals to traders.'" 0
And volume by itself is not a reliable indicator of the presence of valuable
information. In stocks with considerable liquidity, even institutions are able
to buy or sell large blocks without changing the price from the previous
trade.' In perhaps as many as seven hundred firms, liquidity is sufficient to
allow institutions to take substantial investment positions or liquidate their
holdings without lowering prices. 12 Even specialists and market-makers
cannot generally discern which trades are based on inside information and
respond with price adjustments in particular transactions. Even dealers in
over-the-counter stocks cannot readily determine if a stock price change is a
consequence of insider trading or not."' Brokers and others associated with
them can occasionally identify those trading on inside information, and emu-
late them, but the legal prohibitions against insider trading assure that insid-
on the lack of substitutability of securities, a notion rejected by modem financial economics.
See generally Wang, supra note 71.
109. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 13, at 226, 327, note that insiders concealed their
trading even before legal prohibitions were in effect. While the authors concluded that such
secrecy demonstrated that insiders regarded such trading as unfair and immoral, id. at 226, an
alternative explanation might be that insiders wished to avoid signalling the existence of valua-
ble information that could change reservation prices before they executed their trades.
Copeland & Galai, supra note 80, at 1459, assume in their model that a dealer making a
market in a security does not know before hand whether the other side of a transaction has
inside information. "If markets were personal, then traders known to possess superior knowl-
edge could easily be identified and no one would agree to trade with them. One of the services
of a broker is to maintain the anonymity of the client who initiates a trade." Id.
110. Seyhun, supra note 80, at 207. The author observes that "[i]nsiders would have strong
incentive to refrain from trading, or hide their most important information transactions by
trading through friends and relatives to avoid potential sanctions by the SEC." Id. But see
Givoly & Palmon, supra note 80 (concluding that insiders make a major part of their stock
market gains from information revealed through the trades). Givoly and Palmon offer no
explanation of how anonymity is breached, nor why the stronger signals of larger trades do not
produce larger abnormal returns. But cf Plott & Sunder, Efficiency of Experimental Security
Markets with Insider Information: An Application of Rational-Expectations Models, 90 J. POL.
ECON. 663 (1982) (using a simulation model to demonstrate that markets adjust rapidly to
inside information). Plott & Sunder's results, which suggest extremely rapid price adjustments
to new equilibrium levels so that even insiders cannot earn abnormal profits, are inconsistent
with the empirical studies cited supra. In their model, uninformed traders can rapidly surmise
the value of insider information by observing the competitive bids of insiders. This result may
be explained by the fact that the simulation involved use of a situation where either one-third
or one-half of all traders possessed the same inside information, and trading was conducted as
an oral double auction, similar to an exchange, so that trader anonymity was impossible.
111. Dennis, An Investigation into the Effects of Independent Investor Relations Firms on
Common Stock Prices, 28 J. FIN. 373 (1973).
112. A Discussion of Corporate Financial Information, 2, No. 1 MIDLAND CORP. FIN. J. 40,
50-51 (Spring, 1984) (discussion by McConnell).
113. See Benston & Hagerman, Determinants of Bid-Asked Spreads in the Over-the-Counter
Market, I J. FIN. ECON. 353, 359 (1974).
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ers will attempt to disguise their transactions, and thus limit the
circumstances in which emulation will be possible. 14
Powerful, if anecdotal, evidence of the importance of signalling and the
unimportance of trading volume was provided when Edper Enterprises
purchased approximately 6.2 million shares of Brascan Limited's stock, or
roughly 25% of its outstanding shares, in the course of two days with very
little price movement. On April 30, 1979, with bids beginning at $21, Edper
was able to purchase three million shares at prices ranging up to $22.75.'15
Having completed its purchases, Edper then issued a press release stating it
had no plans to acquire additional Brascan shares. 16 The next day, with the
market convinced that no further purchases were planned, Edper was able to
acquire another 3.2 million shares without increasing its bid price of
$22.75.17 This evidence of market insensitivity to demands for large
volumes is consistent with recent reports of Ivan Boesky's successful at-
tempts to dispose of $1.6 billion of securities in takeover targets without
detection. 18
The absence of volume effects on stock prices indicates that signals are not
generally sent to markets by insider trading. The lack of price changes also
indicates that uninformed investors are not induced to enter into market
transactions by insider trading. It is only when market orders are insuffi-
cient to match the insider's order that additional buyers or sellers must be
induced to trade. The trader on the other side of these insider transactions is
likely to be the specialist on the exchange or the market-maker in the partic-
ular stock, who holds himself ready to trade in the absence of other traders,
and who would not trade but for the insider's bid. This is a class of identi-
fied traders who are caused to act by insider activity. To the extent that
specialists unknowingly deal with insiders, they are unable to adjust reserva-
114. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 81, at 574 n.81 (citing Cole, Wachtell Lawyer is Out
in Insider-Trading Case, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1981, at D29, col. 1). The authors reference the
case of employees at E.F. Hutton & Co. who detected insider trading by a partner in a major
Wall Street law firm in advance of tender offers: "[E]mployees at Hutton are understood to
have noticed a pattern in [the partner's] account where, as one source put it, 'He got too lucky
.... 1" Id.; see also Asquith & Mullins, Signaling with Dividends, Stock Repurchases, and
Equity Issues, 15 FIN. MGMT. 27, 41 n. 18 (Autumn 1986) (noting that block traders routinely
mark down the price when buying from sellers whom they fear possess superior information,
and raise prices when selling to investors who specialize in speculating on takeover targets).
115. Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd., [1979 Decisions] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,882, at 95,617, 95,624-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
116. Id. at 95,618-19.
117. Id. at 95,625.
118. Recent newspaper reports suggest that arbitrageur Ivan Boesky liquidated holdings in
excess of $1.6 billion during the late summer and early fall of 1986 without detection by so-
phisticated traders, although there were rumors that he was "lightening up" his holdings. End
of Boesky's Firm May Be Near, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1986, at DI, col. 2.
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tion prices to reflect the fact that the insider will probably gain. The general
inability of brokers and dealers to detect insider trading as it occurs is evi-
denced by studies showing that dealers (market-makers and specialists) who
must deal against insiders and lose to them, compensate themselves for this
risk by increasing the bid-asked spread.119 These studies find a correlation
between the expected volume of insider trading in a security and the size of
the spread. 
120
But to say that specialists and market-makers must transact with insiders
does not mean that all members of the class have a claim for damages from
insider trading. To the extent that the specialist is caused to sell before the
announcement of good news, and to buy before the announcement of bad
news, causation and injury are clear. 121 But if specialists expect to bear that
risk, it becomes an expected cost of doing business, and thus enters into their
cost calculations in the same manner as all other costs. Thus, all traders will
bear some of the cost of insider trading in a particular stock in the form of
transaction costs, and no one trader can claim a disproportionate injury
from undetected insider trading. Given high demand elasticities, issuers
subject to insider trading will bear part of the costs in the form of higher
capital costs. 122 To the extent that insider trading performs services for such
issuers, such as compensating managers or assuring accurate security prices,
these costs may be trivial or even negative. That is a matter for empirical
studies that have not yet been undertaken.
23
2. Detected Trading
Scholes' pioneering work first demonstrated the importance of signalling
in transactions by insiders. 124 There is no reason to believe that his conclu-
sion should be limited to the context of his study, which involved registered
119. Benston & Hagerman, supra note 113; Copeland & Galai, supra note 80; Seyhun,
supra note 80.
120. Seyhun, supra note 80.
121. Specialists are generally thought to spend time researching markets, not issuers.
Where market-makers face an adverse selection problem when dealing with insiders who pos-
sess information not yet reflected in prices:
The market maker establishes a bid and ask price based on the average information
contained in a sale to him or a purchase from him. Those investors with superior
information (information traders) can trade at the dealer's price and make a profit,
whereas those without any information (liquidity traders) incur a loss by trading at
the dealer's quotes.
Stoll, Alternative Views of Market Making, in MARKET MAKING AND THE CHANGING STRUC-
TURE OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRIES 67, 78 (Y. Amihud, T. Ho, R. Schwartz eds. 1985).
122. See generally Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (explaining how issuers bear costs).
123. See generally Carlton & Fischel, supra note 49; Haddock & Macey, supra note 51.
124. See generally Scholes, supra note 90.
1987]
Catholic University Law Review
secondary offerings. Identified trading by insiders does signal the market. It
is the identity of the seller that sends a signal, not the size of the trade.'25
It is clear that there may be instances where signals are sent. For exam-
ple, news of mining engineers in hard hats bearing Texas Gulf Sulphur's
name rushing to the local brokerage office in Timmins, Ontario, might influ-
ence other traders. 126 Rumors, whether or not based on inside information,
may circulate widely enough to change reservation prices for all traders.
1 27
A sudden increase in volume, even absent knowledge of the source of trad-
ing, can signal traders that material information may exist that has not yet
been disclosed. Under these conditions, rational traders may withdraw from
the market rather than risk being on the wrong side of trades with insid-
ers. 128 In these cases, insider trading will deter transactions by those on the
other side. If traders can detect on which side of transactions insiders are
dealing, they can emulate them, and obtain at least part of the gains antici-
pated by the insiders. 129 But they, too, will be dealing with investors whose
decisions were made on other bases, or with specialists and market makers.
In all of these cases, then, only the latter group can demonstrate transaction
causation.
Where price is moved by signals emanating from an insider's trading, such
movement may cause prior trading orders to be executed. Thus, where an
investor has placed a limit order, to buy or sell a particular security if the
market reaches a specified price, that order may be triggered by price move-
ments resulting from observations of insider trading. While plaintiffs might
argue that they have thus been "caused" to buy or sell, more analysis is
required. To the extent that insider trading reveals the presence of valuable
information, it generally moves stock prices in the correct direction.' 3° In
125. Scholes, supra note 90. Givoly & Palmon, supra note 80, confirm Scholes' finding that
size of trades does not influence price.
126. "The rumor mill ... was going full blast. There were press reports April 9 in the
Toronto Daily Star, the Globe & Mail, and in The Northern Miner .... The April 9 account
in the Globe & Mail [stated that] . . . 'Texas Gulf employees have been heavy buyers of the
company's stock through brokerage offices in [Timmins] ...... K. PATRICK, PERPETUAL
JEOPARDY 46-47 (1972).
127. Merrill Action Stumps Street, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1986, at D8, col. 3 (Merrill
Lynch's stock subject of heavy trading without apparent explanation); Big Board Analyzes
Rumor-Fueled Rise of Merrill Lynch Issue, Wall St. J., Jan. 13, 1986, at 13, col. 3. But see CBS
Shares Rise Sharply on Speculation that Investor Group Might Seek Control, Wall St. J., Nov. 4,
1985, at 6, col. 5 (heavy trading clearly linked to rumors); SEC Probing Insider Trading by
Market Professionals, Wash. Post,'-Nov. 5, 1985, at El, col. I (traders purposely start rumors
to manipulate market).
128. See generally supra note 91 and accompanying text.
129. See authorities cited supra note 80.




such a case, the stock would move to that level at some later date, and the
limit order would be triggered in any event. Thus, insider trading has not
affected the price at which the outsider buys or sells, but only the timing of
the transaction.
Only those traders who can show that exogenous subsequent events
caused a countervailing price change in the issuer's stock, so that the limit
price would not have been reached upon the later revelations, can demon-
strate causation. 3' While there may be other circumstances where some
traders can demonstrate transaction causation, these cases are so particular-
ized that their numbers are likely to be trivial.' 32 Indeed, the number of
limit order trades triggered by detected insider trading is also likely to be
trivial.
The result of this analysis is that Fridrich v. Bradford presents a more
economically acceptable notion of causation than Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch
or its progeny. These latter opinions fail to address the hard questions of
causation. If insider traders send no signal when they trade, it is difficult to
argue that they have caused any harm, even when measured by captured
profits. Even a specialist caused to trade on the other side of the insider's
transactions could not prove harm if he was compensated in advance for his
losses by his bid-asked spread.'
33
3. Trading on News of Impending Bids
This Article has described the existence of warehousing activities prior to
the adoption of the Williams Act. Huge market acquisitions by a single
buyer generally signalled the market of an impending bid, and raised reser-
vation prices to reflect that expectation. However, bidders learned that ac-
quisitions by multiple buyers, especially institutions, did not send the same
signal to the market. So valuable was this subterfuge that bidders were will-
ing to share the gains from warehousing with the warehousers, by guarantee-
ing them the difference between the market price and the tender offer price.
The Williams Act effectively precluded warehousing by requiring disclo-
131. Wang, supra note 71, at 1236.
132. Traders who arbitrage between particular stocks and options in those stocks might be
able to argue, for example, that insiders have concentrated their activities in one market or the
other, and thus have created spreads between markets that caused arbitrageurs to trade. But
in most cases these spreads will cause arbitrageurs to enter on the same side as the insiders.
Where insiders buy call options, and drive the price of call options up, it is likely that arbi-
trageurs will see a spread and buy the underlying stock, although in some cases they might be
harmed by selling options.
133. See Seyhun, supra note 80; Copeland & Galai, supra note 80, at 1463; Benston &
Hagerman, supra note 112, at 363.
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sure of the formation of "groups" for the acquisition of target shares.' 34 But
this did not end the attractiveness of the idea, nor the opportunity to per-
form a service for a bidder in this fashion. Risk arbitrageurs may be de-
scribed as the substitutes for warehousers. They purchase shares of targets
on the first signal that a company is "in play" (in the expectation of tender-
ing to a bidder). Risk arbitrageurs receive a profit roughly equivalent to that
earned by warehousers when a bid succeeds. Their incentive, like that of
bidders and warehousers, is to acquire the maximum number of shares possi-
ble without signalling the market that a company is in play. There is every
reason to believe that bidders find the services of the risk arbitrageurs
useful. 1
35
The previous analysis concerning undetected and detected trading applies
to arbitrageurs' acquisitions. The fact that trading activity in advance of the
announcement of a hostile tender offer nearly always increases the target's
price suggests that acquisitions are detected by other traders, or that news of
impending bids is leaked simultaneously. 136 At the same time, large blocks
are accumulated that will be tendered to the bidder. These scenarios are not
a perfect substitute for warehousing because bidder and arbitrageurs may
134. Securities Exchange Act § 13(d)(3), amended by, Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No.
90-439, 82 Stat. 455 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982). For an extensive discus-
sion of the legislative history of § 13(d)(3), see Bath Indus. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97, 108-10 (7th
Cir. 1970).
135. See generally Jensen, Don't Freeze the Arbs Out, Wall St. J., Dec. 3, 1986, at 26, col. 4.
Indeed, in some cases arbitrageurs can assure the success of a bid by themselves, as in the case
of Hanson Trust's bid for SCM. There Hanson terminated its tender offer for SCM shares,
and purchased control privately from a few arbitrageurs who held sufficient SCM stock to
deliver control. Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1985). On the
other hand, an arbitrageur who, after acquiring his stock, puts the target "in play" by re-
vealing his ownership, may disserve a particular bidder by encouraging an auction for a target,
and by driving the target's stock price to the point where a bidder can no longer offer an
attractive premium. This can be viewed as a form of agency cost that cannot be controlled by
contract without creating a Williams Act "group" under § 13(d)(3).
136. Many of the event studies of the price of target shares show substantial price advances
prior to the announcement of a tender offer. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST,
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, STOCK TRADING BEFORE THE ANNOUNCEMENT
OF TENDER OFFERS: INSIDER TRADING OR MARKET ANTICIPATION (1987) (gains of 38.8%
prior to the announcement date for successful tender offers); Bradley, Interfirm Tender Offers
and the Market for Corporate Control, 53 J. Bus. 345, 363 (1980) (showing gains of approxi-
mately 20% for targets later acquired); Dodd, Merger Proposals, Management Discretion and
Stockholder Wealth, 8 J. FIN. ECON. 103, 134 (1980) (gains of 29.95%); Dodd & Ruback,
Tender Offers and Stockholder Returns, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 351, 363 (1977) (showing gains in
excess of 20% prior to the announcement date for targets later acquired). Insiders profit on
this information. See Keown & Pinkerton, supra note 79, at 857. But the Office of Chief
Economist study, supra attributes much of the gain to bidder purchases in securing a toehold
and to press speculation about impending bids. The study recounts the nature of market-
watching by traders designed to detect possible accumulations by bidders.
[Vol. 36:863
Insider Trading
not contract explicitly without signalling the market of an impending bid.
Because of this, arbitrageurs bear more risk than warehousers, since their
information about bidder intentions is imperfect. Further, the Williams
Act 137 requires that all shares may not be purchased at the bid price if a
partial offer is oversubscribed and all who tender are prorated. For the bid-
der, this means that the volume of shares thus warehoused will be under-
produced. Any improvement in the arbitrageur's information will reduce
risk and increase arbitrage activity.
This suggests that bidders would prefer leakage of information about in-
tended acquisitions to a select group of arbitrageurs. Investment bankers
representing bidders would, under this model, serve their clients by passing
on this information to those best able to warehouse large volumes of target
securities with the least effect on price. Bidders would not object to such
"leakage," and sophisticated bidders would not view it as theft of valuable
information, unless the broker or others tipped the target's management or
drove the target's stock price to a level that would make the bid more
expensive.' 38
This description is consistent with observed behavior. Despite the huge
volume of insider trading on tips about bids, and the effect on the price of
target shares, bidders usually do not sue their investment bankers or others
for theft of this information. 
1 39
III. WHAT DRIVES THE DEMAND FOR INSIDER TRADING RULES?
So little harm to investors can be demonstrated in most instances of in-
sider trading that it is small wonder courts have avoided extended discus-
sions and analysis of causation issues. The judicial opinions provide no
coherent theory of transaction causation that establishes significant harm to
investors in impersonal securities markets. Modem descriptions of the oper-
137. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(d)(6) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6)
(1982)), requires the bidder to prorate all shares tendered within the first ten days of a tender
offer. Under rule 14d-8, 17 C.F.R. 240.14d-8 (1986), the proration period is extended to the
entire period of a partial tender offer.
138. One news report speculates that Victor Posner may have provided arbitrageur Ivan
Boesky with information about Posner's plans to take over Fischbach Corporation, as evi-
denced by Boesky's sale and Posner's purchase of identical blocks of Fischbach stock and
convertible debentures on successive days. Broker's Role: Deals in Boesky Probe Show Increas-
ing Links With Drexel Burnham, Wall St. J., Dec. 5, 1980, at 1, col. 5. Other reports show
that insider information acquired by Dennis Levine about impending bids was marketed by his
employers to prospective targets, which, while not illegal under the securities laws, represents
a harmful use of the bidder's information. Fallen Star: How Inside Knowledge Made, Ruined
Career of Dennis B. Levine, supra note 1.
139. But see Litton Sues Levine, Shearson Lehman Over Itek Trading, Wall St. J., Aug. 20,
1986, at 2, col. 2.
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ation of securities markets suggest that uncompensated harm from insider
trading may be trivial. Damage suits in insider trading cases, then, would be
confined to a very small number by the concepts of trading activity described
in Part II of this Article.
Given the trivial amount of harm to individual investors, what theory ex-
plains the demand for insider trading rules? The answers to this question are
by no means central to this Article, but they are too interesting to ignore
entirely. I will explore both public interest and interest group theories
below.
A. Public Interest Theory No. 1: Harm to the Market-
Insider Trading Sanctions
With the passage of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act, Congress made
explicit a justification of insider trading bans not dependent on arguments
about harm to specific traders or firms. Congress indicated that the presence
of insider trading creates externalities that harm other investors." ° The
most common form of the argument is that knowledge that others are play-
ing with superior information causes demoralized investors to abandon the
market, since they will decline to play on terms that dictate systematic losses
to insiders. 4 ' This was in fact the argument used to justify draconian civil
penalties for insider trading at three times the insider's profits.'42
This argument ignores the fact that insider trading generally does not
cause any particular investor to trade, and that investors who do trade do so
at exactly the price they set as their reservation price. Just as specialists can
increase their spreads, other traders can discount the price they pay to reflect
expected insider trading losses, although discounts generally should be triv-
ial.' 43 Since much insider information need not be disclosed in the absence
of trading, '" the investor is no more harmed by insider trading than by the
140. Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (Supp. 1986) (amending the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, §§ 21(d), 32, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d), 78ff) (providing for civil penalties of three
times the amount of profit gained or loss avoided by insider trading).
141. See generally Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 353-56 (1979).
142. The House report justified the need for stricter insider trading sanctions on the basis
that "[c]apital formation and our nation's economic growth and stability depend on investor
confidence in the fairness and integrity of our capital markets. Insider trading threatens these
markets by undermining the public's expectations of honest and fair securities markets where
all participants play by the same rules." H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1983).
143. For a general discussion of investor discounts under such conditions, see Scott, Insider
Trading: Rule lOb-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801, 807-09 (1980).
144. S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969), first enunciated the rule of "disclose or abstain" from trading for insiders. While
confusion surrounds the area, see, e.g., In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22,214
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lack of disclosure. Indeed, this was recognized in Fridrich v. Bradford. 145
Further, to the extent that insider trading is detected, it signals traders of the
existence of valuable information, and pushes stock prices toward levels that
more accurately reflect the value of the issuer. Traders who are thus reas-
sured that markets are efficient are unlikely to be demoralized by the profits
of others.
B. Public Interest Theory No. 2: Jealousy Will Cause Investors to Forego
Superior Investment Opportunities
Given the obvious weakness of the previous argument, proponents of in-
sider trading bans fall back on a more general, and ultimately unprovable,
argument that traders are so jealous and venal that even if insider trading
does not cause them harm on particular transactions, they will be demoral-
ized by knowing that others are earning profits they could have earned them-
selves if only they also possessed the information. Thus, they will forego
normal returns because they do not expect to earn extraordinary returns. To
state the argument this explicitly is to render it implausible. It also demon-
strates the level of abstraction required to make the argument.
But because this argument addresses the entire market, and the willing-
ness of investors to participate in it, it merits further examination, despite
this implausibility. Rational investors can choose from a variety of financial
instruments, not all traded on securities markets.' 46 These investors seek the
best available returns given the riskiness of an investment. Stocks compete
with all other instruments in this market. To the extent that insider trading
reduces expected profits to investors in stocks, it will reduce the price of all
stocks subject to insider trading, to the level where stocks once again become
attractive and competitive investments. 147 Further, insider trading costs are
in fact reflected in bid-asked spreads that compensate specialists for their
losses in trading with insiders. These spreads become a cost of raising capi-
tal for firms subject to insider trading. In this scenario, if insider trading
[1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,801 (July 18, 1985); Block, Barton
& Garfield, Affirmative Duty to Disclose Material Information Concerning Issuer's Financial
Condition and Business Plans, 40 Bus. LAW. 1243 (1985), experienced practitioners continue
to hold the view that no disclosures are required by Rule lob-5 absent a trade or another
statement made misleading by the omission of the inside information. Lipton, Flom &
Sporkin, Selected Acquisition Problems Under Rules 10b-5 and 10b-6 and Under Section 16(b),
in 8TH ANN. INST. SEC. REG. 233, 245-47 (Freund ed. 1977).
145. 542 F.2d 307, 318 (6th Cir. 1976).
146. See generally Easterbrook, Managers' Discretion and Investors' Welfare: Theories and
Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540 (1984).
147. This is the same efficiency argument made by Brudney, supra note 66, at 356, that
insider trading is a public "bad," or a negative externality, that increases the cost of capital
generally.
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prospects were truly damaging to stock values, we would expect to see firms
interested in reducing the cost of capital adopting their own rules against
insider trading.14 ' Generally such rules are not observed in U.S. markets,
and, indeed, bans on insider trading are by no means universal in other so-
phisticated securities markets. '49
While it is impossible, using current empirical techniques, to test whether
investors are in fact driven from the market by the fact that others earn
greater profits than they do, recent experience suggests otherwise. An-
nouncements of the SEC's settlement with arbitrageur Ivan Boesky disclosed
perhaps the largest identified insider trading profits of all time. Boesky ad-
mitted to profits of $50 million, but others have suggested that his profits
might have been as large as $200 million.150 While the market took a one-
day dip, it quickly recovered all of those losses and more, suggesting little
investor concern with Boesky's profits. Indeed, the Chairman of the SEC
has assured Congress that the Boesky revelations had an insignificant effect
on the market."' 1
The ultimate result must be to question whether the public interest justi-
fies allocation of scarce SEC enforcement resources to this area. In its recent
extensions of insider trading bans to the takeover area, the SEC has aban-
148. David Haddock and Jonathan Macey have demonstrated that in efficient markets
managers will share expected insider trading profits with shareholders by reducing forms of
manager compensation. Haddock & Macey, supra note 51.
149. Even prior to federal regulation,
certain companies, usually under the dominance of some strong individual, decline to
permit anyone connected with the concern, whether as director or as employee to
conduct speculative operations in the corporate stock. On the other hand, it is cer-
tain that this is not the general practice; and that many directors feel perfectly free to
buy and sell, though there is a certain squeamishness about disclosing their
operations.
A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 13, at 327. On insider trading rules in other nations, see
generally B. RIDER & H. FRENCH, THE REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING (1979). The
authors note that insider trading is considered proper in Japan, although limited rules are now
in effect. Id. at 361. Hong Kong once regulated insider trading, but has repealed its rules, id.
at 328, while France has a narrow prohibition, with enforcement activity "nearly nil," since
insider trading is not considered immoral. Id. at 238. While historically the United Kingdom
had no insider trading regulation, id. at 146, 445, insider trading regulations were adopted in
1985. Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act, 1985 Eliz. II, ch. 8 (Mar. 11, 1985). Can-
ada, under pressure from the United States, adopted federal insider trading rules in 1970. B.
RIDER & H. FRENCH, supra at 125.
150. Boesky Apparently Reaped at Least $203 Million in Illicit Profits With Levine's Inside
Information, Wall St. J., Nov. 24, 1986, at 2, col. 2.
151. Testifying at a House oversight hearing on December 11, 1986, SEC Chairman John
Shad was reported to have reassured the committee that the repercussion of the announcement
proved to be fleeting. "By the end of the (next) week, the market had bounced back, and the
market has gone on to a new all-time high." SEC Permitted Boesky Actions to Cut Partner-
ship's Liabilities $1.32 Billion, Wall St. J., Dec. 12, 1986, at 3, col. 1.
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doned all pretense of investor protection, and has relied on unfairness argu-
ments previously rejected as forming a valid basis for rulemaking under the
antifraud provisions of the securities laws. The emphasis, thus, is not on
investor injury, but on investor profits and the perception that it is somehow
unfair for traders to earn large profits when others do not.
C Interest Group Theories
The bankruptcy of the SEC's analysis can only lead to conjecture about
hidden agendas. If the public interest does not provide a justification for
insider trading bans and enforcement, we must search elsewhere for an ex-
planation for the continued viability of bans on the activity. Are there pri-
vate interests to be served? Is the SEC protecting the property rights of
investment bankers in confidential information received from issuers, the
property rights of target managers in their positions, or the interest of the
Commission in increasing its enforcement activities?
David Haddock and Jonathan Macey have provided one explanation:
they believe that if insider trading is banned, those in the next best position
to receive and profit from inside information are investment bankers. "2 Not
only is such use of inside information not illegal under insider trading rules,
it has been reported in the popular press.153
The constant shifting of justifications for insider trading bans in the take-
over area suggests that the SEC and managers of target firms may also bene-
fit from these rules, especially as they are applied under the Williams Act.
To the extent that arbitrage activity is facilitated by advance information on
impending bids, and this activity in turn facilitates transfers of control, in-
cumbent managers of potential targets have strong incentives to advocate
retention and extension of the bans imposed by rule 14e-3.
A final potential beneficiary of insider trading bans may be the SEC staff
itself. Much SEC activity is of interest to only small groups of voters, and
thus to small numbers of the Congress. While the special interests benefitted
by these regulations may lobby the Congress to sustain SEC budgets, they
may be unable to generate broadly based support for the agency. In con-
152. Haddock & Macey, supra note 51; Macey & Haddock, Regulation on Demand: The
Influence of Special Interest Groups on SEC Enforcement of Insider Trading Rules, 30 J. LAW
& EcON. (forthcoming, 1987).
153. Dennis Levine's information was used by his employers to solicit business from pro-
spective targets, which was not forbidden by rule lOb-5, but was harmful to bidders. On the
other hand, Levine's unlawful trades assisted bidders, by accumulating shares that would be
tendered. If Levine leaked information to a sufficient number of other traders, causing revi-
sions in reservation prices, this would have harmed bidders. Fallen Star: How Inside Knowl-
edge Made, Ruined Career of Dennis B. Levine, supra note 1.
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trast, insider trading enforcement activity generates headlines. Revelations
of large insider trading profits create opportunities for congressional hear-
ings, which in turn provide additional opportunities for SEC requests for
budget increases to augment enforcement activity. Recent SEC budget re-
quests suggest that instead of investor protection, the real agenda may be
bureaucratic budget maximization, based on a populist campaign against
large trading profits."5 4
IV. CONCLUSION
Legal theories of investor harm from insider trading are confused at best
and overbroad at worst. Investor choices in trading markets are not influ-
enced by the presence or absence of insiders. Only a small percentage of
insider trades can be described as causing someone to trade who otherwise
would not have done so. The largest percentage of these trades are likely to
be with specialists and their spread. The general lack of harm to issuers and
bidders for corporate control makes all the more puzzling the demand for
insider trading rules, and the moral fervor of the proponents of these rules.
The amount of harm suggested by this Article suggests no role for public
enforcement of property rights in information in this area beyond that appli-
cable in all other areas.
154. A recent newspaper article noted that new life has been breathed into antitakeover
legislation by reason of these insider trading cases, and that there are renewed calls for a larger
SEC enforcement budget and increased enforcement powers for the SEC. Wall Street May
Face Big Changes in Wake of the Boesky Scandal, Wall St. J., Dec. 3, 1986, at 1, col. 6. The
budget maximization hypothesis was first developed by William Niskanen. See W. NISKANEN,
BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971).
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